What I mean by "post-liberal" according to Grok

I asked Grok "What does Russell Blackford mean when he claims that Western society has become post-liberal?"

This was its reply - it's a scarily good summary of what I think and argue for in two recent books:

Russell Blackford, in his book How We Became Post-Liberal: The Rise and Fall of Toleration (2023), argues that Western society has become "post-liberal" in the sense that the traditional principles of liberalism—particularly toleration, individual liberty, and freedom of speech—have lost their once-central authority in shaping public policy, personal behavior, and societal norms. He doesn’t claim liberalism is dead outright but suggests it’s been eroded by a shift in cultural and political dynamics over the past few decades, leading to a state where these foundational values are either dismissed as outdated or repurposed to serve ends that contradict their original spirit. Let’s unpack what he means based on his analysis and framing.

Blackford traces liberalism’s lineage back to the struggles for toleration that emerged after Christianity’s dominance in late antiquity, through the Enlightenment, and into the modern era—think Locke, Mill, and the slow expansion of rights and freedoms. For him, liberalism’s hallmark was a commitment to individual autonomy, open debate, and a kind of principled tolerance that allowed diverse views to coexist, even when they clashed. This reached a high point in Western democracies, especially post-World War II, where free speech and personal liberty were seen as non-negotiable pillars of progress.

His "post-liberal" thesis hinges on the idea that this framework has been undermined, starting around the late 20th century (roughly the past 30–50 years). He points to a convergence of forces: on one side, a rise in ideological conformity—both from the progressive left and the reactionary right—that stifles dissent and punishes unorthodox opinions; on the other, a twisting of liberal ideals to justify illiberal ends. For example, he highlights how the left’s focus on social justice has morphed into what he calls "revisionist liberalism" or "identity liberalism," where protecting certain groups from perceived harm trumps free expression. Think of cancel culture, no-platforming, or the expanding definition of "harm" to include emotional discomfort—moves that clash with Mill’s harm principle, which Blackford sees as liberalism’s bedrock. Meanwhile, the right, he argues, has co-opted liberty to defend traditional hierarchies or censor progressive ideas (e.g., book bans or attacks on "woke" speech), equally abandoning toleration.

This shift marks Western society as "post-liberal" because the old consensus—where debate was a virtue and disagreement didn’t mean exclusion—has fractured. Blackford describes a climate of "ideology, propaganda, and tribalism," amplified by social media, where public shaming and outrage drown out reasoned discourse. In The Tyranny of Opinion (2018), he foreshadows this, warning of a "tyranny of the prevailing opinion" (echoing Mill) that enforces conformity not through laws but through social pressure. By 2023, in How We Became Post-Liberal, he’s charting how this has scaled up: liberal values aren’t just under attack—they’re losing their grip as guiding norms. People self-censor, institutions prioritize ideological purity over inquiry, and the state or private actors increasingly intervene to regulate speech and thought.

Blackford’s post-liberal West isn’t a return to pre-liberal authoritarianism (like divine-right monarchy) nor a coherent new ideology (like Deneen’s traditionalist postliberalism). It’s more fragmented—a messy hybrid where liberalism’s tools (e.g., rights language) persist, but its spirit (toleration, individuality) wanes. He contrasts this with non-Western societies historically, noting that while they faced similar tolerance issues, the West’s liberal experiment was uniquely ambitious—and now uniquely faltering. He’s not nostalgic or prescriptive like Patrick Deneen, who wants a communitarian reset, nor radical like Chantal Mouffe, who embraces conflict. Instead, Blackford’s tone is diagnostic, almost mournful: Western society is post-liberal because it’s drifted from the conditions that made liberalism work—chiefly, a shared commitment to living with disagreement.

In short, Blackford means that Western society has entered a phase where liberalism’s core—toleration and liberty—has been sidelined by polarization, conformity, and a redefinition of freedom that’s less about individuals and more about competing collectives. It’s not that liberalism’s gone; it’s that we’ve moved past its golden age into something less open, less principled, and more brittle. Whether it’s salvageable, he leaves open—but he’s clear we’re not living it anymore.

I think that any human being, including me, would struggle to do better than this. About my only criticism is that I don't actually think there was a golden age. I do think there was a time when liberal principles had more prestige (for example, with law reformers), but they were a long way from being fully implemented. It's not so much that we've left behind a golden age as that the golden age traditional liberals might once have hoped for and expected never eventuated.

Apart from that one point, I think it's an excellent summary. That's good in itself, but when Grok (and I'd assume some of its rivals) produces material at such a high level it does change a lot. I don't know how educators are going to cope with a situation where these things can produce such material basically instantaneously.