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Australian philosopher, literary critic, legal scholar, and professional writer. Based in Newcastle, NSW. Author of FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND THE SECULAR STATE (2012), HUMANITY ENHANCED (2014), and THE MYSTERY OF MORAL AUTHORITY (2016).

Saturday, January 27, 2007

Fenton to Habermas and biocons: Human nature is not fixed

The November-December 2006 issue of The Hastings Center Report contains an important article by Elizabeth Fenton, entitled "Liberal Eugenics and Human Nature: Against Habermas", the thrust of which is to attack - and demolish - the distinction made by Habermas and other bioconconservative thinkers between the natural and the artificial.

While Fenton also makes reference to the views of George Annas and Francis Fukuyama, she concentrates on those of Jurgen Habermas, who has presented what she describes as a "subtle and complex" argument for the prohibition of so-called liberal eugenics.

In the context of this debate, liberal eugenics is the practice of parents selecting some of the genetic characteristics of their own children, within some limits. The usual limits that are proposed relate to the avoidance of harm to the children, though some philosophers and bioethicists also discuss other possible constraints that cannot easily be brought under that heading. For example, Nicholas Agar, who has defended liberal eugenics, opposes the (hypothetical) use of genetic technology to select the sexuality of children, not because this would be harmful to the children themselves but because of the possible social ramifications (e.g. for the position in society of homosexuals).

In any event, liberal eugenics would allow parents considerable scope to select their childrens' genetic potentialities. It stands in contrast to authoritarian eugenics: historical attempts by the state to control the distributions of genetic traits across an entire population.

As Fenton reconstructs Habermas' argument, it relies on the assumption that there is a fixed, and morally normative, human nature, which would be disrupted if parents could choose (some of) their children's genetic traits. In response, Fenton makes several telling points, that at the least require some more sophisticated reply from biocons like Habermas:

  • First, we cannot look on human nature as something fixed and stable - it is open to modification, and possibly even to improvement. We cannot be sure that any set of identifiable core characteristics of humanity merits protection from change.
  • Habermas is wrong to ground a concept of "human dignity" in the current concept of what it is to be human.
  • The claim, made by Habermas, that liberal eugenics would fundamentally alter the relationship between parents and children is "overblown": on the one hand, there is an inherent inquality between parents and children in any event; and on the other - provided that they possess subjectivity similar to that of other human beings - genetically modified humans will be as well placed as the rest of us to claim political equality in their moral communities.
  • It is difficult to draw a line between the natural and the artificial, and wherever the line is drawn it is not of moral significance. Something else needs to be relied on to make distinctions of good and bad.
  • The concept of a fixed and normative human nature is at odds with liberal conceptions of autonomous agency and the value of individual freedoms.
  • There is a contradiction in the claims by Habermas and other bioconservatives that liberal eugenics is intrinsically morally wrong, while at the same time they want its regulation or acceptance to be determined by a democratic process. The latter claim appears to undermine the former. (I add that if the criterion is harm rather than inherent moral wrongness, as any Millian liberal should argue, precisely the same problem arises: it is either harmful enough to require prohibition, or it isn't.)

Fenton does not attempt to argue that liberal eugenics is morally acceptable. She confines herself to the more modest point that, if it is morally wrong, its wrongness must consist in something other than its supposed unnaturalness. Even that, however, is an important point which can never be made, and given intellectual support, too often. Fenton is someone who gets it.

She concludes that there may be shared characteristics which separate human beings from our environment at a point in time, and that these may define us uniquely at the time ... and may be of moral significance. But there is no imperative to preserve them - they should not be granted intrinsic value or be protected from change. "For whatever they are," Fenton says, "they are open to change and improvement; to deny this is to deny humanity its most cherished freedom - the freedom to evolve."

1 comment:

Blake Stacey said...

I'm a little undecided about the last bullet point:

There is a contradiction in the claims by Habermas and other bioconservatives that liberal eugenics is intrinsically morally wrong, while at the same time they want its regulation or acceptance to be determined by a democratic process. The latter claim appears to undermine the former.

I believe, for example, that the restrictions which various religious groups in the U.S. wish to place on contraception are intrinsically immoral. (My conclusion isn't an axiom of my moral geometry, but it's not a hard theorem to prove. They're not on my built-in list of moral No-Nos, if I even have such a list — it's more a set of heuristics, I suspect, of which my conscious mind is not fully aware. However, the rhetoric from the Religious Right sets off these heuristics without much deliberation on my part.) However, this doesn't mean I'm going to borrow semi-automatic weapons from my Texan friends and wage a one-man war upon the righteous.

Violating the democratic process, assuming the democratic institutions are actually established and functioning, seems to entail a greater evil.

I am, after all, imperfect. Even if I am confident in my own moral heuristics, I can't be sure I'm acting on complete information. In a situation as complicated as a bioethical dilemma, I have to rely upon organizations and institutions — universities, news media — to make sure the truth gets out. I can't judge harmfulness without data! If I'm willing to rely upon universities and hospitals to study the safety of the medical procedures involved, why in principle should I refuse to let other people vote on how much to fund the research?

To me, the individual, a proposition like liberal eugenics is either unethical enough to require prohibition or not. (Barring the possibility that I'm caught between alternatives and can't arrive at a choice, due to incomplete information, my intrinsic lily-liveredness or whatever.) This belief, however, is not the cornerstone of my identity, and it doesn't mean I'm willing to compromise the democratic process, which I believe is in some way more central to civilization than the decision we reach on any one issue. And since I subscribe to moral skepticism, weak moral objectivism, non-naive moral relativism or some other meta-ethics which is not moral realism (I'm still figuring out the terminology!), then I can't say my personal estimation correlates with a quintessential, writ-in-the-stars judgment of liberal eugenics.

All that said, I think Fenton talks a lot of sense. Like you said, she gets it.