tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post8192559714076481170..comments2023-10-26T22:06:11.166+11:00Comments on Metamagician3000: It's okay to change your mindRussell Blackfordhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12431324430596809958noreply@blogger.comBlogger10125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-65416459433013667592007-10-11T19:31:00.000+10:002007-10-11T19:31:00.000+10:00Aaaarrggghhh, more problems about these (perhaps h...Aaaarrggghhh, more problems about these (perhaps hypothetical) sects that refuse to act in what seem like the best interests of their children. I was just replying, in an unsatisfactory (or at least unsatisfying) way, to an issue about this that came up in comments on an earlier post.<BR/><BR/>I suppose my gut feeling - which isn't necessarily a good way to do philosophy but let's get it on the table anyway - is that if it were my kid I wouldn't want it to be held back by the fact that someone else refuses, based on their private or religious morality, to do the same for their kid. I mean, wasn't this the original example, rather than it being differential wealth that led to one kid not getting enhanced? I guess I'm siding with Thomas here, or maybe just showing my transhumanist prejudices. <BR/><BR/>The analogy is to the Amish, who won't let their kids go to school beyond about the age of 14. Surely we wouldn't think it incumbent on us to make sure our kids don't have the benefits, positional and otherwise, of extended education, out of solicitude for the Amish falling behind.<BR/><BR/>But there's a problem of course. What do we, then, do about the Amish and their educational practices? The US Supreme Court allowed them to keep the kids out of school - they argued, and the court accepted, that it was necessary to save the Amish culture. You could google to find the judgment.<BR/><BR/>But does something like a culture have a "right" to continue to exist if education causes people to leave it voluntarily? There's some controversy about that USSC decision, but on the other hand, in a liberal society, how heavy-handed are we going to be? Conversely, is a liberal answer good enough if the welfare of kids is involved? It looks to me as if there just is a tragic clash of genuine values here. Whatever we do, we won't entirely solve it, but the one thing we certainly won't do is let the Amish hold back everybody else.<BR/><BR/>Would it be different if the Amish were the majority, while a minority wanted to give their kids much longer educations? I don't see how it would be.<BR/><BR/>Stuart, I led a graduate seminar program about transhumanism this semester for the honours philosophy students, and a couple of them are now writing essays - though not theses. There's no honours year for bioethics, but it might be worth your while to have a talk to Justin Oakley or Rob Sparrow about what possibilities there might be to look at this stuff when you do honours.Russell Blackfordhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12431324430596809958noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-77940963040827533312007-10-08T13:30:00.000+10:002007-10-08T13:30:00.000+10:00But ultimately isn't it a matter of 'luck' that a ...<I>But ultimately isn't it a matter of 'luck' that a person has what it takes to get the highest grade?</I><BR/><BR/>Yes, but it is luck that we cannot control, as well as "someone has to do it". Besides, I can claim that that you are using our current society to proove wrong an abstract example (perhaps in my ideal society anyone who wants to go to university can)<BR/><BR/>However, the analogy you draw at the end is very clever: a sect that refuses to send its children to university. I have to admit you have swung me over quite a bit with that one.<BR/> <BR/>My intuition might be a little different compared to most others, but I would claim that the sect does not have the right to deny their children this education. (This is further pronouced if we use an example like "the sect believes that all girls cannot attend")<BR/> <BR/>Is the solution for society to force the kids into the education (or transhumanism)?<BR/> <BR/>Is the solution to allow their parents to do what they will, pass on to their children a massive disadvantage?<BR/> <BR/>Like I said - I am not conviced of either side, but it seems to be that doing nothing is not a clean answer.<BR/> <BR/>Imagine in the future it is common practise to take 100 intelligent apes, lock them up so they can't move and kill them and harvest their organs every year. This drasically improves mental and physical properties. Now you think this is wrong, but the-world-philosophical-body has deemed it acceptable practise.<BR/> <BR/>If you had the choice for doing this for yourself, and you decided not to, I believe this is a "free choice".<BR/> <BR/>If you had the choice for doing this for your child, I don't believe we can see this as a free choice in the same context. If you don't do it it will negatively impact your child. Thus society is forcing you to choose between you morals and someone elses happiness.<BR/><BR/>The reason I use this analogy is to try to get an insight as to why religious people might see it as an unfair choice that they have to make.<BR/><BR/>Now, the flaw that I can see my argument is the lack of options. While I might not like forcing Religious people to make that choice, that might be the lesser of two evils.<BR/><BR/>Like I said from the start, I am not overally convinced by my argument, but it seems that there is more going on than meets the idea: To force someone to choose between their ideals and someone else's happiness.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-81865583829547696382007-10-08T00:06:00.000+10:002007-10-08T00:06:00.000+10:00"In the case of university education, the person w..."In the case of university education, the person who gets the education does so because they got the highest grade, so they would be more suited (overall) to the higher paid job."<BR/><BR/>But ultimately isn't it a matter of 'luck' that a person has what it takes to get the highest grade? <BR/><BR/>I agree that there is unfairness in our university system but I don't see how it can harm my case. In any case we can make the analogy more abstract and closer to your argument. Suppose we have some educational institution, open to every one, and provides extremely valuable careers based education. It develops exactly the skills employers want so having such an education is a serious advantage to getting. Suppose further this is the only institution to provide such training. Now there is a sect which sees education as unnatural and therefore children born into this sect never get this education. Those children, however, are just as capable before training as others, the training is not necessary for any job, though it is useful, and the people of the religious sect aspire to all the areas of employment that the training is useful for. Is there anything wrong with sending one's children to such an institution? It seems to me no. Is there anything wrong with having the institution? Certainly if it is possible to cater for the concerns of the sect that would be desirable, but even if this is impossible it seems to me fairly clear that there is nothing wrong with having the institution. What do you think? Does it matter what the size of the sect is, or the nature or usefulenss of the training? Or is there still some disanalogy between this and genetic enhancement?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-64320573601086867632007-10-07T17:35:00.000+10:002007-10-07T17:35:00.000+10:00I'd be interested to know if you see any significa...<I>I'd be interested to know if you see any significant points of disanalogy between human enhancement and university education.</I><BR/><BR/>I suppose the main difference is <I>why</I> the 'person who benefits' benefits.<BR/><BR/>In the case of human enhancement the person who gets enhanced because their complete luck to be born to rich parents - it is random.<BR/><BR/>In the case of university education, the person who gets the education does so because they got the highest grade, so they would be more suited (overall) to the higher paid job. <BR/><BR/>(you might say this is a simplistic answer, and in a way you are correct, but there are many ‘unfair’ aspects of university education – ie. Poor families being under represented – which colours the analogy you draw.)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-35759809175107280802007-10-06T17:41:00.000+10:002007-10-06T17:41:00.000+10:00Stuart, If your argument is just based on their be...Stuart, <BR/><BR/>If your argument is just based on their being a limit to success in a capitalist society I don't see how you can draw the conclusion that A is doing anything wrong. It seems to me that overall utility is unlikely to be reduced as a result of A enhancing her children, she just allows her children some of the utility B's children would have had if A had not enhanced her children. But why should an action that changes the distribution of wealth from what it would have been inherently unjust? <BR/><BR/>Maybe it's the inegalitarian nature of the outcome, but in this case there are so many other aspects of our society that are inegalitarian that it's hard to see why this one would be any worse. I mean why not criticise universities because people who do not go to university end up with worse jobs? Even if the universities didn't accept full-fee paying students and there were no private schools, still some people would get into university and some would not so we would have an inegalitarian outcome. Indeed maybe some religions have problems with people being educated in secular environments so religious children are disadvantaged. I'd be interested to know if you see any significant points of disanalogy between human enhancement and university education. <BR/><BR/>Thomas HendreyAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-7529429811932918942007-10-04T19:01:00.000+10:002007-10-04T19:01:00.000+10:00I guess you aren't really missing anything - my st...I guess you aren't really missing anything - my statement wasn't very well laid out.<BR/><BR/>I also agree with your examples and what you've said, but I think in the case of transhumanism perhaps A and B do owe C some form of responsbility.<BR/><BR/>So - A decides to enhance their children so they will be happier and more sucessful<BR/><BR/>B decides, because of religious reasons, not to use any transhumanism.<BR/><BR/>C is the children of B, who had no say in the orginal agreement. C has no right to complain that A's children are happier, but it seems to me that C does have a right to complain if they are more sucessful - since success in our society has a limit (ie. We can't all be upper class having other people working for us)<BR/><BR/>If C has a right to complain that A's children are now more sucessful than he (his kind?) can be, through a transaction that occured of which he had no say it just made me think. Your original point was was that you disagreed with<BR/><BR/><I>We should not act so as to create a situation where people who have the religious worldview come under social pressure to act in ways that are contrary to their worldview.</I><BR/><BR/>Now I am not saying that you are wrong and Fukuyama is correct, but it seems to me that more is going on than meets the eye.<BR/><BR/>If B felt social pressure for something relating to themselves, it would be a different story.<BR/><BR/>But that is not the case - they are feeling social pressure to act for an exchange that they shouldn't be fundamentally responsible for.<BR/><BR/>Anyway, I have been thinking about it a great deal, as I would like to write my honours thesis on it, but that depends on a great variable of things such as whether or not you can even do honours in bioethics n the first place.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-57699179045950168712007-10-03T20:28:00.000+10:002007-10-03T20:28:00.000+10:00Stuart, there's too much there for me to address i...Stuart, there's too much there for me to address it all right now, but I'll just look at your last question. A and B perform a consenting act that negatively affects C. You ask whether C has a right to complain.<BR/><BR/>It seems to me that whether C has a right to complain, relative to a moral system, depends on whether the rules of that moral system say that C has been <I>wronged</I> by the act of A and B. Whether the moral system's answer is the correct one will depend on your standards for moral systems - e.g. you may think that there is only one correct moral system, to be assessed by some standard or other, in which case, you need to know this: does the correct moral system tell us that C has been wronged?<BR/><BR/>It appears clear enough that there are cases where the consenting behaviour of A and B negatively affects C, but it is plausible A and B have not wronged C.<BR/><BR/>Here's an example. C applies for a job and she will be a strong candidate - indeed, she is likely to get the job. A encourages B to apply for the job and helps B write her application. As a result of A's actions in assisting B, C misses out on the job. C has been negatively affected by the consensual actions of A and B, but it looks to me as if C has no basis to complain. One way of expressing this is to say that A and B were within their rights to act as they did.<BR/><BR/>I'm not committed to a rights theory of morality, or necessarily to any particular kind of moral theory. But it does seem to me that this is a case where most moral theories or systems will say that C has no basis for complaint.<BR/><BR/>Of course, there are other cases where C clearly does have a basis for complain. E.g. A and B may get together (consensually) to murder or rob or swindle C.<BR/><BR/>Am I missing something, or misunderstanding something? The answer seems to be that it depends.<BR/><BR/>With the bit about the possibility that A has the power to ensure that C is not negatively affected, again it will depend. Even if, in my example, A were rich enough to pay C enough money to ensure that C was just as happy as if she got the job, we don't tend to think that she's morally obligated to do so. Morality doesn't extend that far in requiring that we be soliticitous the interests of others whom our actions affect, or so we tend to believe unless perhaps we are radical utilitarians.<BR/><BR/>Again, what am I missing?Russell Blackfordhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12431324430596809958noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-28529970828564956822007-09-29T21:21:00.000+10:002007-09-29T21:21:00.000+10:00I think that you and I are arguing from subtly dif...I think that you and I are arguing from subtly different interpretations of what it means to "lose our humanity". I was thinking more along the lines that when the differences are so notable that we are literally talking about subspecies. I was also assuming that all humans went down this path. I also feel that, if you consider all of humankind moving into a subspecies as a result of transhumanism, the arguments that you mentioned for the original wilderness may also apply, particularly the sentimental attachment.<BR/><BR/>I suppose a better thought experiment might be to 'breed out' dingo's everywhere and turn them into domestic dogs. If they leave a much happier life...<BR/><BR/>I know this is quite off topic, but the argument I am most interested in at the moment (and what I was originally planning on doing my honours about) was Francis Fukuyama's argument that you addressed:<BR/><BR/>http://metamagician3000.blogspot.com/2006/11/human-enhancement-and-religious.html<BR/><BR/>At first I was convinced that you were correct, but now I am not so sure. I think that point 7. is an enormously complicated one. In the form you have written, I tend to agree, but the problem with bioethics is that the party that ends up disadvantaged is the children. Therefore if religious people refuse to participate, the people who are suffering are those unluckily enough to be randomly born to religious parents.<BR/><BR/>This reminds me a lot of the Nozick/Cohen debate I am doing at studying at the moment with Rob Sparrow. If A and B perform a transaction between consenting adults, but it negatively affects C, does C have right of complaint? This is further complicated by the fact that, say, B has the authority to make sure C is not negatively affected, which is rational to do so, yet refuses.<BR/><BR/>What responsibility does A have? It doesn't seem obvious to me to answer "none". Of course, it certainly doesn't seem right to me to answer "complete responsibility".Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-28750432702832513902007-09-29T20:02:00.000+10:002007-09-29T20:02:00.000+10:00^I wonder whether there aren't extraneous issues f...^I wonder whether there aren't extraneous issues feeding into that intuition about a value in preserving humanness itself. We may have some kind of sentimental attachment to our historical selves. I'm not even going to say that there's anything wrong with a degree of sentimentality about such things, but it can't be determinative ... otherwise why not worry that there are no Spartan warriors anymore?<BR/><BR/>Or we may have difficulty <I>really</I> imagining a scenario where we'd be able to retain characteristics such as self-consciousness, capacity for self-reflection, sense of ourselves in time, and so on, while at the same time ceasing (by some standard to be human).<BR/><BR/>Similarly, there may be extraneous factors shaping the intuition about that last piece of wild ground in the US. We may value diversity itself to an extent, and feel something was lost if a particular kind of wilderness disappeared entirely, making one less in the world. Or we may have a sentimental attachment to that particular kind of wilderness (for historical reasons and cultural reasons perhaps). Or we may feel sympathy for other people who'd have such an attachment. I would in fact feel uncomfortable doing what you say with that thought experiment, but I find it hard to believe that it's because I'm concerned at some level about what was "originally conceived".Russell Blackfordhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12431324430596809958noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-68721375336099784242007-09-28T10:55:00.000+10:002007-09-28T10:55:00.000+10:00Alternatively, even if we thought it was no longer...<I>Alternatively, even if we thought it was no longer appropriate to apply the word "human" to ourselves (or our descendants), where does that point lead us? Would we (or they) somehow have lost moral worth?</I><BR/><BR/>Unlikely that we would have lost our moral worth, true. But I can't help but feel that there is something intrinsically desirable to stay 'human'. Most people's intuitions say that there is, while it is worth examining otherwise, I tend to lean towards the majority.<BR/><BR/>If you imagine the last patch of wilderness in the USA. This 20km x 20km piece of land is the last part of country that hasn't been disrupted. Now I propose we change it. Get rid of those weeds, with more plant life we will have more animal life. Add some Australian trees that are drought resistant. I propose some changes that will make the land thrive with many more species, as well as the species that exist.<BR/><BR/>I think that most people would find this wrong - there just seems to be something wrong with losing what was 'originally' conceived. Of course my example is probably riddled with flaws (ie. not measuring humans are part of the ecosystem) but I think the point remains in bioethics.<BR/><BR/>There has to be some reason why we would want to keep an aspect of our humanity. Some reason why, biologically speaking, we don't want to remove ourselves from our ancestors. Some reason why increases in happiness (which at some point must be only marginal) isn't the counter argument for changing ourselves.<BR/><BR/>It was a very interesting article - makes me even more annoyed that you can't do honours in bioethics!<BR/><BR/>StuartAnonymousnoreply@blogger.com