tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post7986259300987936737..comments2023-10-26T22:06:11.166+11:00Comments on Metamagician3000: More from WolterstorffRussell Blackfordhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12431324430596809958noreply@blogger.comBlogger12125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-73646345200748832902010-11-21T23:57:43.385+11:002010-11-21T23:57:43.385+11:00John wrote: "The very idea of natural rights ...John wrote: "The very idea of natural rights is based upon a claim that God instituted in natural law a moral order."<br /><br />Perhaps that's true of Wolterstorff's argument, which I haven't read. But in general I don't think it's true. Most people have a strong intuitive belief in moral obligations and natural rights, and apologists who make this kind of argument usually appeal to that intuition. Many atheists will accept the premise, and they presumably are not doing so on the basis of any belief in God having instituted a moral order.<br /><br />"No other support for that claim makes even the slightest sense..."<br /><br />I think an appeal to intuition makes some sense. In my view it takes some good reasoning to see that this intuition is mistaken.Richard Weinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18095903892283146064noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-33702065022258296702010-11-20T23:47:43.335+11:002010-11-20T23:47:43.335+11:00Indeed Russell, thanks for applying the principle ...Indeed Russell, thanks for applying the principle of charity there - all these almost synonyms of the English language continues to haunt us non-natural speakers. <br />@ John: I concede re. Sam Harris, but wonder about this: "The very idea of natural rights is based upon a claim that God instituted in natural law a moral order." Well, from Hobbes and on there has been some opposition to that idea, hasn't it? And before Christianity, the idea of basing moral truths on theories of human nature or reason was the norm, it seems. But perhaps you mean very specific ideas about the content of these rights? That is, while there are, at least, minimally plausible ideas in metaethics besides "supernatural constructivism", none of these would render the actual rights that W. would like to have justified. I agree. Kant made the daring attempt to prove otherwise but, as far as I can tell, even Kantians nowadays admit that he failed splendidly.Christian Munthehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03373442927438898939noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-78780338085907220102010-11-20T23:11:06.871+11:002010-11-20T23:11:06.871+11:00"Valid" isn't much use at all if one..."Valid" isn't much use at all if one or more of the premises are implausible. I take it that Christian M meant "valid" rather than "sound". If we judge an argument to be sound we are saying that it is deductively valid AND its premises are true. But it's clear that that's not what Christian had in mind.<br /><br />Although these sorts of arguments are valid, they seem to me to work backwards because they start off with a claim that is, <i>ex hypothesis</i>, highly controversial, and supposedly false unless the similarly controversial conclusion is accepted. That's pretty shaky.<br /><br />In this case, we should conclude that it's very dubious whether there are natural inherent rights of the kind under discussion (which should lead us to attempt a more nuanced analysis of human rights), rather than concluding that God exists.Russell Blackfordhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12431324430596809958noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-34705212833776397582010-11-20T20:49:09.673+11:002010-11-20T20:49:09.673+11:00Valid logic really isn't very impressive on it...Valid logic really isn't very impressive on its own, though.<br />"Garbage In; Garbage Out", to use a phrase from computation.Svlad Cjellinoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-13467460362898334372010-11-20T14:42:59.564+11:002010-11-20T14:42:59.564+11:00A lot of these new-fangled theistic arguments use ...<i>A lot of these new-fangled theistic arguments use that kind of logic.</i><br /> Soon they'll progress from sentential calculus to quantifier logic. I guess it's a step up from deeming the syllogism the whole of logic....<br /><br /> Does that make Plantinga and his modal ontological argument an outlier? He's an over acheiver if sentential calculus is the happening thing in theistic logic.Briannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-76414610701785714792010-11-20T10:37:19.331+11:002010-11-20T10:37:19.331+11:00As always it relies upon assumptions that subtly i...As always it relies upon assumptions that subtly include a petito. The very idea of natural rights is based upon a claim that God instituted in natural law a moral order. No other support for that claim makes even the slightest sense (and certainly not Sam Harris' latest attempt at moral naturalism). So the argument resolves to:<br /><br />God made natural rights.<br /><br />Natural rights imply a God.<br /><br />Therefore there is a God.John S. Wilkinshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04417266986565803683noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-24115595537201497732010-11-20T09:57:07.467+11:002010-11-20T09:57:07.467+11:00But yes, the argument is valid. It's more or l...But yes, the argument is valid. It's more or less:<br /><br />P is true if and only if Q is true (so thus: ~Q --> ~P); P is true; therefore Q is true.<br /><br />So:<br /><br />1. ~Q --> ~P<br />2. P<br />Therefore ~~P (from 2.)<br />Therefore ~~Q (Modus tollens)<br />Therefore Q.<br /><br />A lot of these new-fangled theistic arguments use that kind of logic.Russell Blackfordhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12431324430596809958noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-76484134807559933062010-11-20T09:52:04.142+11:002010-11-20T09:52:04.142+11:00This comment has been removed by the author.Wonderisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14159308813060038586noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-2621191320990578082010-11-20T09:51:43.706+11:002010-11-20T09:51:43.706+11:00This comment has been removed by the author.Wonderisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14159308813060038586noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-22932299083336330392010-11-20T09:51:17.869+11:002010-11-20T09:51:17.869+11:00This comment has been removed by the author.Wonderisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14159308813060038586noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-25149334469566830612010-11-20T09:48:45.433+11:002010-11-20T09:48:45.433+11:00You really need to read the book (Justice) to see ...You really need to read the book (<i>Justice</i>) to see how he tries to ground the claim that natural inherent human rights can be grounded (only) theistically. I don't find his attempted grounding very plausible, but I can't do, um, justice to it in a short post or comment.Russell Blackfordhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12431324430596809958noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-22548520089311834322010-11-20T09:38:31.289+11:002010-11-20T09:38:31.289+11:00I actually find the logic of the argument sound. B...I actually find the logic of the argument sound. But it depends on the assumption that there are fundamental human rights, and the validity of W's argument for the claim that there can't be any such right unless teism holds. But if those two hold up to scrutiny, we can do the inference:<br /><br />1. There are fundamental human rights (A)<br />2. Unless teism is true, there can't be any fundamental human rights (If A, then B)<br />3. Therefore: teism is true (B)<br /><br />Having said that, I don't believe either that there are fundamental human rights, or that the truth of claims that there are such rights are dependent on the truth of teism. Would be interesting if you had a quote where the argument for premise 2 is set out, Russell.Christian Munthehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03373442927438898939noreply@blogger.com