I'm going to attend a "community roundtable" of the National Human Rights Consultation Committee in a few weeks' time. I have no idea how these things work - how many people go along, how much chance individuals get to present their views, and so on. I suppose I should try to find out, but it may well vary. A lot of these community roundtables are in quite small towns; they may have to do it differently here in a big city.
I guess there's no point in over-preparing, as I may only get to ask one question, or take part in a syndicate group, or something equally frustrating. Still, I've been wondering about what point to hammer if I only get a chance to say one thing.
Should it be my concern about threats to freedom of speech and expression, or my general view that what is required is political and cultural struggle from people who are committed to a defence of basic liberties, or just the importance of the Millian harm principle in liberal democracies? Should it be a warning about trying to constitutionalise the wrong things, or against adopting a mechanism that won't survive constitutional review? Or something else? There are many important issues, and I can't cover more than a tiny fraction of what I put in my written submission.
Maybe I should just seem pleasant and rational ("Seems, Madam?"), and concentrate on commending the written submission ... but I'm still wondering which point to hammer if I only get a chance at one. Problems, problems.
About Me
- Russell Blackford
- Australian philosopher, literary critic, legal scholar, and professional writer. Based in Newcastle, NSW. My latest books are THE TYRANNY OF OPINION: CONFORMITY AND THE FUTURE OF LIBERALISM (2019); AT THE DAWN OF A GREAT TRANSITION: THE QUESTION OF RADICAL ENHANCEMENT (2021); and HOW WE BECAME POST-LIBERAL: THE RISE AND FALL OF TOLERATION (2024).
Tuesday, March 24, 2009
"What Is Transhumanism?"
With Parijata Mackey, I've written a piece called "What Is Transhumanism?", which has been published online at the Exception magazine, a fascinating news magazine based in Portland, Maine.
"The body of thought that deals with enhancement technologies is called transhumanism," we say. "In essence, transhumanists favor using technology to enhance mental and physical human capacities.
"For transhumanists, the human species is about to begin a new form of evolution. Instead of biological evolution – slow processes of survival, reproduction, and adaptation over geological time – it will be powered by technologies that will increasingly work their way inwards, radically transforming our bodies and minds."
Please consider reading the whole article, and if you like it give it a nice rating. If you don't like it, I can only suggest you pretend you haven't read it.
While you're there, have a look around the magazine, which is nicely done indeed.
"The body of thought that deals with enhancement technologies is called transhumanism," we say. "In essence, transhumanists favor using technology to enhance mental and physical human capacities.
"For transhumanists, the human species is about to begin a new form of evolution. Instead of biological evolution – slow processes of survival, reproduction, and adaptation over geological time – it will be powered by technologies that will increasingly work their way inwards, radically transforming our bodies and minds."
Please consider reading the whole article, and if you like it give it a nice rating. If you don't like it, I can only suggest you pretend you haven't read it.
While you're there, have a look around the magazine, which is nicely done indeed.
Monday, March 23, 2009
More good material from Irving
Professor Irving seems to me to be on strong ground when she argues that many new rights are not apt for constitutionalisation.
While I am actually strong on such matters as "sexuality rights", "reproductive rights", "the right to die with dignity", and "environmental rights", I agree to some extent with Irving that that they "rest upon values or claims that are still controversial, and still open to reasonable disagreement."
She says, I think correctly:
They are current topics of public debate. In casting these values as "rights," their supporters seek to make them unassailable and foreclose debate. This is not merely inconsiderate towards those with different perspectives, it is also detrimental to the democratic process which requires open and robust debate about competing values.
Again:
Even where it is clear that a matter is a "right" rather than value claim, it needs to be recognized that different rights derive from, and belong to, different fields. Some arise from the natural law tradition. Others are creatures purely of legislation. Some rights are available to the individual alone, others to groups or classes of person; some rest on a distinction between citizens and non-citizens; others are enjoyed by natural persons only, and still others extend also to corporate persons; some are enforceable only against governments, others against private actors as well. Some rights are "negative," taking the form of prohibitions on legislation. Others are "positive," expressed as guarantees that can be asserted against governments.
I agree with this as far as it goes. Indeed, I've always argued that we need to be careful not to confuse fundamental political rights, such as freedom from the state compelling what religion we adopt, with the messy political business of working out the scope of, and exceptions to, anti-discrimination laws giving legal entitlements against private parties.
In my submission to the Human Rights Consultation, I argue as follows in respect of anti-discrimination law:
In some cases, e.g. where there is widespread prejudice, some individuals could suffer from the cumulative decisions even of individuals who do not, taken one by one, possess much power. For example, people from a certain racial background might suffer discrimination at the hands of shop owners and proprietors of similar businesses that supply goods and services to the public. The cumulative effect of many discriminatory acts could have drastic impacts on the welfare of somebody from a widely-despised or disliked background. For this reason, there is merit in enacting legislation that forbids racial discrimination in supplying goods and services to the public. Similarly, there is merit in enacting legislation that forbids racial discrimination in employment. Indeed, there is merit in creating a strong framework of equal opportunity and anti-discrimination law; this has become an accepted function of the state in modern society.
But the details of anti-discrimination law — particularly the issue of where tolerable kinds of discrimination by people in their private lives end, and the need for regulation of various kinds of private power begins — are for the day-to-day political process. Reasonable people and reasonable political parties can disagree about just which transactions should be regulated and how, what grounds of discrimination are important problems within a jurisdiction, what exceptions should be made to anti-discrimination law, and so on. Unlike the exercise of power by the state itself, these are not matters that are apt for constitutionalisation.
Thus, there is legitimate scope in some circumstances for the state to require those who wield intermediate power in society to do so subject to legal rights that are assigned to individual citizens who stand at the weaker ends of power relationships. However, there is no general rule that constitutional limitations on the power of the state should have equivalents whenever individual citizens deal with each other. To imagine otherwise would be to neglect the important difference between the vertical relationship of citizen and state and the horizontal relationships among citizens. It would also show a poor understanding of the sheer complexity of the various power relationships among citizens and other parties that interact beneath the overarching protection of state power. In many cases, there are good reasons to use law to regulate these other power relationships, but reasonable minds will differ on the manner and extent, and the law must be open to detailed amendment from time to time.
However, none of this entails that legislatures should have unlimited power to encroach on our private decision-making in areas such as sexuality and expression. If we are not talking about some kind of controversial right to resources, or against private parties, I see nothing wrong in principle with developing constitutional arrangements that will keep the government from muzzling us or prying into our bedrooms.
While I am actually strong on such matters as "sexuality rights", "reproductive rights", "the right to die with dignity", and "environmental rights", I agree to some extent with Irving that that they "rest upon values or claims that are still controversial, and still open to reasonable disagreement."
She says, I think correctly:
They are current topics of public debate. In casting these values as "rights," their supporters seek to make them unassailable and foreclose debate. This is not merely inconsiderate towards those with different perspectives, it is also detrimental to the democratic process which requires open and robust debate about competing values.
Again:
Even where it is clear that a matter is a "right" rather than value claim, it needs to be recognized that different rights derive from, and belong to, different fields. Some arise from the natural law tradition. Others are creatures purely of legislation. Some rights are available to the individual alone, others to groups or classes of person; some rest on a distinction between citizens and non-citizens; others are enjoyed by natural persons only, and still others extend also to corporate persons; some are enforceable only against governments, others against private actors as well. Some rights are "negative," taking the form of prohibitions on legislation. Others are "positive," expressed as guarantees that can be asserted against governments.
I agree with this as far as it goes. Indeed, I've always argued that we need to be careful not to confuse fundamental political rights, such as freedom from the state compelling what religion we adopt, with the messy political business of working out the scope of, and exceptions to, anti-discrimination laws giving legal entitlements against private parties.
In my submission to the Human Rights Consultation, I argue as follows in respect of anti-discrimination law:
In some cases, e.g. where there is widespread prejudice, some individuals could suffer from the cumulative decisions even of individuals who do not, taken one by one, possess much power. For example, people from a certain racial background might suffer discrimination at the hands of shop owners and proprietors of similar businesses that supply goods and services to the public. The cumulative effect of many discriminatory acts could have drastic impacts on the welfare of somebody from a widely-despised or disliked background. For this reason, there is merit in enacting legislation that forbids racial discrimination in supplying goods and services to the public. Similarly, there is merit in enacting legislation that forbids racial discrimination in employment. Indeed, there is merit in creating a strong framework of equal opportunity and anti-discrimination law; this has become an accepted function of the state in modern society.
But the details of anti-discrimination law — particularly the issue of where tolerable kinds of discrimination by people in their private lives end, and the need for regulation of various kinds of private power begins — are for the day-to-day political process. Reasonable people and reasonable political parties can disagree about just which transactions should be regulated and how, what grounds of discrimination are important problems within a jurisdiction, what exceptions should be made to anti-discrimination law, and so on. Unlike the exercise of power by the state itself, these are not matters that are apt for constitutionalisation.
Thus, there is legitimate scope in some circumstances for the state to require those who wield intermediate power in society to do so subject to legal rights that are assigned to individual citizens who stand at the weaker ends of power relationships. However, there is no general rule that constitutional limitations on the power of the state should have equivalents whenever individual citizens deal with each other. To imagine otherwise would be to neglect the important difference between the vertical relationship of citizen and state and the horizontal relationships among citizens. It would also show a poor understanding of the sheer complexity of the various power relationships among citizens and other parties that interact beneath the overarching protection of state power. In many cases, there are good reasons to use law to regulate these other power relationships, but reasonable minds will differ on the manner and extent, and the law must be open to detailed amendment from time to time.
However, none of this entails that legislatures should have unlimited power to encroach on our private decision-making in areas such as sexuality and expression. If we are not talking about some kind of controversial right to resources, or against private parties, I see nothing wrong in principle with developing constitutional arrangements that will keep the government from muzzling us or prying into our bedrooms.
Where I agree with Helen Irving
Professor Irving is not opposed to limitations on legislative power as such, or to judicial review to determine whether the legislature has acted within its constitutionally-mandated limits. I agree with this, of course. But there is then a question as to what those limits should be. Generally, this is not addressed in her submission, although she does defend certain rights of procedural fairness.
She objects to certain content going in a Bill of Rights, and on this I also agree with her.
Specifically, she objects to any Bill of Rights whose content requires that judges go beyond the sort of judicial review mentioned above, and "answer political questions and provide legal remedies for controversies concerning policy." For example, she objects to a draft Bill of Rights proposed by the New Matilda campaign, which she describes as providing for rights that extend far beyond civil and political rights, to include a wide range of positive socio-economic rights, albeit with a provision requiring courts to consider costs and the financial capacity of the public sector to provide for such a right. As she says:
Such a provision ... would empower the courts to order governments to submit financial statements, budget papers, and justifications for fiscal policy. The courts would become, effectively, tribunals where judges challenged budget decisions or the costing of public programs. The separation of powers would be severely damaged. The time and cost involved in this process would also seriously hinder the normal work of the courts.
Irving adds:
Every good society should provide the best levels of health and education and housing, the best opportunities for decent and well-paid employment, a clean and healthy environment, and much more. But according to which criteria are we to decide whether these claims have been met? How are we to know whether the resources available have been optimally or equitably allocated?
Again, I concur. As she argues, these are not questions that should be justiciable in courts of law. As I would put it, they are the stuff of day-to-day politics.
Here is how I argued the point in my own submission to the National Human Rights Consultation:
Notoriously, there is no general agreement about what level of overall taxation should be levied, what tax mix is most desirable, or which government programs should be the highest priority. Debate about these issues is the stuff of day-to-day politics, with "left-wing" political parties generally seeking to expand government programs, while "right-wing" wing parties generally seek to contract them. (In fact, this is simplistic since "right-wing" politicians often end up leading high-spending administrations that splurge public revenue on such dubious projects as foreign wars, extreme efforts to suppress the trade in recreational drugs, subsidies to big business, etc.) This is all part of day-to-day politics in a country such as Australia, and I submit that it should not be constitutionalised. At least in Australia's situation, a Bill of Rights need not spell out the role of the state in conducting programs related to such things as housing and education. That role should, of course, continue, but the precise outcomes must be determined through the political process, including the negotiation of party platforms and the regular testing of rival platforms through democratic elections.
As well as being unnecessary and at odds with ordinary political processes in Australia, the constitutionalisation of positive rights to such things as housing and education would not be readily justiciable. While the modern state should gather revenue and provide resources for these programs, its duty to do this is one of imperfect obligation. That is to say, the state has a broad discretion in how the duty is to be performed. Democratic politics assumes this, as the electorate is given the choice of rival sets of policies that are themselves expressed at a fairly vague level. Thus, it is not possible to specify in a document such as the Australian Constitution or a supplementary Bill of Rights exactly what positive steps a government must take in order to fulfil its duty. ...
Finally, on this point, it is not necessary that a nation's constitution spell out the entire role of a modern state. If it did so, it would mention not only the provision of services such as education and housing but also the state's fundamental Hobbesian functions. The apparatus of the state enables large societies to exist and prosper, without the kind of war of all against all feared by Hobbes. It does so by such means as establishing a system of property (taking some resources from the commons and allocating them to individuals or groups), sustaining a market for goods and services, banning most uses of violence to obtain advantage (hence we have laws against murder, rape, armed robbery, and so on, although we leave some limited scope for prowess in violence by permitting heavily-regulated martial sports such as boxing). In order to carry out these roles, the state must spend revenue on such institutions as police forces and criminal courts, but also systems of registration for major items of property such as allotments of land. In addition, it attempts to deter — and where necessary to resist — attacks from foreign enemies, and thus spends revenue on military personnel and equipment.
It might be suggested, with considerable plausibility, that everyone has a "right" that the state provide such things as a system of property, a criminal justice system, the armed forces, and so on. Certainly these things are necessary for large societies to function with internal peace and a degree of security from external attack. However, it is not necessary to spell out rights to these things in a constitution. The moral here is that the role of the state, even its most fundamental role, need not, and should not, be constitutionalised. A document such as the Australian Constitution need not delineate the vast range of governmental responsibilities under contemporary conditions. A subsidiary document such as a Bill of Rights should be restricted to fairly precise specification of those things that the state should not do, but which governments of all persuasions may be tempted to do.
Some of Irving's examples in existing non-entrenched Charters of Rights are worth considering. E.g., the Victorian Charter requires courts to consider whether a person who has "a particular cultural, religious, racial or linguistic background" has been denied "the right, in community with other persons of that background, to enjoy his or her culture, to declare and practise his or her religion and to use his or her language." I don't think that the objection that Irving makes to this is so clear-cut as her objection to, say, a constitutional right to something as open-ended as good health or education or housing. Nonetheless, it is a tricky question for the courts. It requires an investigation of social and historical issues to determine what "backgounds" exist and whether a person has such a "background".
Again, the ACT Human Rights Act states: "[t]he family is the natural and basic group unit of society and is entitled to be protected by society."
Irving responds:
This provision requires the courts to resolve questions about the identity of the family and the indicia of its integrity, notwithstanding the fact that the family is social institution, the character of which has long fascinated and taxed ethnographers and social historians. Again, these are not judicial inquiries.
My difficulty is more that this is an example of a contentious anthropological cum moral claim being given the force of law.
Irving suggests that many people who advocate a Bill of Rights hold up the redress of indigenous disadvantage as an example. I agree with her that this is not a good use for a Bill of Rights. It is not a simple matter to draft a provision protecting indigenous people from adverse government actions when it is controversial, even among indigenous people, just which actions are adverse. For example, it is not clear whether, on balance, the current Commonwealth Intervention is adverse or the opposite. That is a matter of political opinion that is not readily, or appropriately, justiciable. As Irving says:
A court cannot determine whether a highly-complex set of processes and actions, based on detailed legislative and administrative schemes, with reference to conduct that is ongoing and future-oriented, is or is not “adverse.” This is a matter for political debate, for public discussion and input, for fine-tuning, for long-term planning, for compromise, for balancing of interests, for hard decisions about means and ends and resources. In short, the sorts of things that are done in the political realm.
But none of this amounts to an objection to the kind of Bill of Rights that I want: a constitutionally-entrenched limitation on the ability of legislatures to abridge freedom of speech and expression - and not just political speech - or other basic negative rights such as freedom of belief and conscience. Such provisions have proved workable in, for example, the US and Canada. There is no reason why they should not be here in Australia. Furthermore, with governments that are continually finding new ways to attack freedom of speech and expression, we could certainly do with such provisions.
She objects to certain content going in a Bill of Rights, and on this I also agree with her.
Specifically, she objects to any Bill of Rights whose content requires that judges go beyond the sort of judicial review mentioned above, and "answer political questions and provide legal remedies for controversies concerning policy." For example, she objects to a draft Bill of Rights proposed by the New Matilda campaign, which she describes as providing for rights that extend far beyond civil and political rights, to include a wide range of positive socio-economic rights, albeit with a provision requiring courts to consider costs and the financial capacity of the public sector to provide for such a right. As she says:
Such a provision ... would empower the courts to order governments to submit financial statements, budget papers, and justifications for fiscal policy. The courts would become, effectively, tribunals where judges challenged budget decisions or the costing of public programs. The separation of powers would be severely damaged. The time and cost involved in this process would also seriously hinder the normal work of the courts.
Irving adds:
Every good society should provide the best levels of health and education and housing, the best opportunities for decent and well-paid employment, a clean and healthy environment, and much more. But according to which criteria are we to decide whether these claims have been met? How are we to know whether the resources available have been optimally or equitably allocated?
Again, I concur. As she argues, these are not questions that should be justiciable in courts of law. As I would put it, they are the stuff of day-to-day politics.
Here is how I argued the point in my own submission to the National Human Rights Consultation:
Notoriously, there is no general agreement about what level of overall taxation should be levied, what tax mix is most desirable, or which government programs should be the highest priority. Debate about these issues is the stuff of day-to-day politics, with "left-wing" political parties generally seeking to expand government programs, while "right-wing" wing parties generally seek to contract them. (In fact, this is simplistic since "right-wing" politicians often end up leading high-spending administrations that splurge public revenue on such dubious projects as foreign wars, extreme efforts to suppress the trade in recreational drugs, subsidies to big business, etc.) This is all part of day-to-day politics in a country such as Australia, and I submit that it should not be constitutionalised. At least in Australia's situation, a Bill of Rights need not spell out the role of the state in conducting programs related to such things as housing and education. That role should, of course, continue, but the precise outcomes must be determined through the political process, including the negotiation of party platforms and the regular testing of rival platforms through democratic elections.
As well as being unnecessary and at odds with ordinary political processes in Australia, the constitutionalisation of positive rights to such things as housing and education would not be readily justiciable. While the modern state should gather revenue and provide resources for these programs, its duty to do this is one of imperfect obligation. That is to say, the state has a broad discretion in how the duty is to be performed. Democratic politics assumes this, as the electorate is given the choice of rival sets of policies that are themselves expressed at a fairly vague level. Thus, it is not possible to specify in a document such as the Australian Constitution or a supplementary Bill of Rights exactly what positive steps a government must take in order to fulfil its duty. ...
Finally, on this point, it is not necessary that a nation's constitution spell out the entire role of a modern state. If it did so, it would mention not only the provision of services such as education and housing but also the state's fundamental Hobbesian functions. The apparatus of the state enables large societies to exist and prosper, without the kind of war of all against all feared by Hobbes. It does so by such means as establishing a system of property (taking some resources from the commons and allocating them to individuals or groups), sustaining a market for goods and services, banning most uses of violence to obtain advantage (hence we have laws against murder, rape, armed robbery, and so on, although we leave some limited scope for prowess in violence by permitting heavily-regulated martial sports such as boxing). In order to carry out these roles, the state must spend revenue on such institutions as police forces and criminal courts, but also systems of registration for major items of property such as allotments of land. In addition, it attempts to deter — and where necessary to resist — attacks from foreign enemies, and thus spends revenue on military personnel and equipment.
It might be suggested, with considerable plausibility, that everyone has a "right" that the state provide such things as a system of property, a criminal justice system, the armed forces, and so on. Certainly these things are necessary for large societies to function with internal peace and a degree of security from external attack. However, it is not necessary to spell out rights to these things in a constitution. The moral here is that the role of the state, even its most fundamental role, need not, and should not, be constitutionalised. A document such as the Australian Constitution need not delineate the vast range of governmental responsibilities under contemporary conditions. A subsidiary document such as a Bill of Rights should be restricted to fairly precise specification of those things that the state should not do, but which governments of all persuasions may be tempted to do.
Some of Irving's examples in existing non-entrenched Charters of Rights are worth considering. E.g., the Victorian Charter requires courts to consider whether a person who has "a particular cultural, religious, racial or linguistic background" has been denied "the right, in community with other persons of that background, to enjoy his or her culture, to declare and practise his or her religion and to use his or her language." I don't think that the objection that Irving makes to this is so clear-cut as her objection to, say, a constitutional right to something as open-ended as good health or education or housing. Nonetheless, it is a tricky question for the courts. It requires an investigation of social and historical issues to determine what "backgounds" exist and whether a person has such a "background".
Again, the ACT Human Rights Act states: "[t]he family is the natural and basic group unit of society and is entitled to be protected by society."
Irving responds:
This provision requires the courts to resolve questions about the identity of the family and the indicia of its integrity, notwithstanding the fact that the family is social institution, the character of which has long fascinated and taxed ethnographers and social historians. Again, these are not judicial inquiries.
My difficulty is more that this is an example of a contentious anthropological cum moral claim being given the force of law.
Irving suggests that many people who advocate a Bill of Rights hold up the redress of indigenous disadvantage as an example. I agree with her that this is not a good use for a Bill of Rights. It is not a simple matter to draft a provision protecting indigenous people from adverse government actions when it is controversial, even among indigenous people, just which actions are adverse. For example, it is not clear whether, on balance, the current Commonwealth Intervention is adverse or the opposite. That is a matter of political opinion that is not readily, or appropriately, justiciable. As Irving says:
A court cannot determine whether a highly-complex set of processes and actions, based on detailed legislative and administrative schemes, with reference to conduct that is ongoing and future-oriented, is or is not “adverse.” This is a matter for political debate, for public discussion and input, for fine-tuning, for long-term planning, for compromise, for balancing of interests, for hard decisions about means and ends and resources. In short, the sorts of things that are done in the political realm.
But none of this amounts to an objection to the kind of Bill of Rights that I want: a constitutionally-entrenched limitation on the ability of legislatures to abridge freedom of speech and expression - and not just political speech - or other basic negative rights such as freedom of belief and conscience. Such provisions have proved workable in, for example, the US and Canada. There is no reason why they should not be here in Australia. Furthermore, with governments that are continually finding new ways to attack freedom of speech and expression, we could certainly do with such provisions.
50 Voices of Disbelief at Amazon
50 Voices of Disbelief: Why We Are Atheists now has its own page at Amazon, with an announced publication date of 10 September 2009. You can register to be informed when the book is actually published.
Sunday, March 22, 2009
Helen Irving on constitutional rights
I'm currently reading the submission made by Professor Helen Irving, of the University of Sydney's Law School, to the National Human Rights Consultation Committee.
This is a well-argued document that displays, as one would expect, a strong grasp of Australian constitutional law. I find much to agree with and much to disagree with, but it's a document that's worthy of examination and respect. It is compatible with my own submission at least to the extent that Professor Irving's arguments against the constitutionalisation of positive economic rights are along similar lines to mine (in my own submission to the Committee), which has not appeared, as yet, on the Committee's website. I also agree with her view that one popular model for reform that is doing the rounds would be unconstitutional in requiring the High Court to give advisory opinions, contrary to the requirements of Chapter III of the Constitution. I've dealt with this in my own submission.
However, the general viewpoint offered is, all in all, far more conservative than my own.
I'll come back to Professor Irving's submission over the next couple of days and make a few comments to elaborate on the above, but meanwhile, without embracing its specific recommendations, I do draw attention to it as a legally-solid and useful contribution to the debate.
This is a well-argued document that displays, as one would expect, a strong grasp of Australian constitutional law. I find much to agree with and much to disagree with, but it's a document that's worthy of examination and respect. It is compatible with my own submission at least to the extent that Professor Irving's arguments against the constitutionalisation of positive economic rights are along similar lines to mine (in my own submission to the Committee), which has not appeared, as yet, on the Committee's website. I also agree with her view that one popular model for reform that is doing the rounds would be unconstitutional in requiring the High Court to give advisory opinions, contrary to the requirements of Chapter III of the Constitution. I've dealt with this in my own submission.
However, the general viewpoint offered is, all in all, far more conservative than my own.
I'll come back to Professor Irving's submission over the next couple of days and make a few comments to elaborate on the above, but meanwhile, without embracing its specific recommendations, I do draw attention to it as a legally-solid and useful contribution to the debate.
Saturday, March 21, 2009
Religious vilification gig - reminder
I'm reminding myslf, and other readers, that on 26 March 2009 I'll be talking to the Humanist Society on the topic "Liberalism, humanism, and freedom of speech: The trouble with religious vilification laws".
The venue is Balwyn Library, 336 Whitehorse Road, Balwyn (Melway map reference 46 E8). This is free, but a gold coin donation at the door is encouraged, No booking is required; just turn up at 8 pm.
The venue is Balwyn Library, 336 Whitehorse Road, Balwyn (Melway map reference 46 E8). This is free, but a gold coin donation at the door is encouraged, No booking is required; just turn up at 8 pm.
No respect
Here is Cardinal Cormac Murphy-O'Connor, complaining about the disrespectful treatment of poor Pope Ratzinger in a British newspaper. I've provided a copy of the cartoon that the Cardinal is referring to.=========
Sir, I was appalled at the tasteless cartoon depicting Pope Benedict XVI. No newspaper should show such disrespect to a person who is held in high esteem by a large proportion of Christians in the world. To pillory the Pope in this way is totally unacceptable. As to what Pope Benedict said, it would be wiser for people to look at the issues that he was raising in his remarks. It is certainly true that the widespread distribution of condoms can run the risk of greater promiscuity and that the best way to combat the Aids epidemic is by healthcare, education and fidelity in married life. Even if people do not accept the Church’s teaching in this matter, it is a well-known fact that the greatest contribution to health care for those living with Aids in Africa is given by the Catholic Church.
Cardinal Cormac Murphy-O’Connor
Archbishop of Westminster
========
As it happens, I support the pope's freedom of speech. For example, I do not want him jailed for a crime against humanity for urging that condoms not be used in Africa to combat the AIDS crisis. Still, I can definitely see the problem with this, given the enormous loss of life that may follow if the Pope's advice is taken seriously.
I defend freedom of speech consistently, partly on the basis that there are many ways to respond to bad speech other than by simply suppressing it. One such way is by treating it - and its perpetrators - to ridicule. There are other ways, too, such as (in this case) pressing for renewed efforts to provide condoms in Africa. All in all, though, the ridicule of ridiculous doctrines is one very good response to them. Cardinal Murphy-O'Connor should be grateful that he lives in a liberal democracy where free speech is protected, and that free speech still has some acceptance as an international norm, despite the best efforts of the Vatican to undermine it.
Friday, March 20, 2009
New articles at Journal of Evolution and Technology
The Journal of Evolution and Technology has published new articles by Stefan Lorenz Sorgner and Austin Corbett.
In "Nietzsche, the Overhuman, and Transhumanism", Sorgner argues that there are significant similarities between transhumanism's concept of the posthuman and the Nietzschean concept of the overhuman. He compares these two concepts, focusing more on their similarities than their differences (by contrast to an earlier discussion by Nick Bostrom). At the same time, he seeks to identify a dimension of Nietzsche's though that is lacking in transhumanism.
"Beyond Ghost in the (Human) Shell" , by Austin Corbett deals with the image of the cyborg, drawing on the work of Donna Haraway. In the light of this, Corbett examines the discourses of humanity, modernity, Japan, and technology. He traces the early history of the cyborg through to modern conceptions in Haraway's work and elsewhere, then examines the idea in the Ghost in the Shell mythos, particularly Kenji Kamiyama’s 2002-2003 TV series Kōkaku Kidōtai Sutando Arōn Konpurekkusu (Ghost in the Shell: Stand Alone Complex).
These articles illustrate the breadth of JET's cross-disciplinary interests in a topics that illuminate the human or posthuman future.
In "Nietzsche, the Overhuman, and Transhumanism", Sorgner argues that there are significant similarities between transhumanism's concept of the posthuman and the Nietzschean concept of the overhuman. He compares these two concepts, focusing more on their similarities than their differences (by contrast to an earlier discussion by Nick Bostrom). At the same time, he seeks to identify a dimension of Nietzsche's though that is lacking in transhumanism.
"Beyond Ghost in the (Human) Shell" , by Austin Corbett deals with the image of the cyborg, drawing on the work of Donna Haraway. In the light of this, Corbett examines the discourses of humanity, modernity, Japan, and technology. He traces the early history of the cyborg through to modern conceptions in Haraway's work and elsewhere, then examines the idea in the Ghost in the Shell mythos, particularly Kenji Kamiyama’s 2002-2003 TV series Kōkaku Kidōtai Sutando Arōn Konpurekkusu (Ghost in the Shell: Stand Alone Complex).
These articles illustrate the breadth of JET's cross-disciplinary interests in a topics that illuminate the human or posthuman future.
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
Wilkins on internet censorship
Over at his Australia-related blog, The Drought Resistant Philosopher, as opposed to his blog at Scienceblogs, Evolving Thoughts, Aussie philosopher John Wilkins has published an outstanding post on the threat of internet censorship.
"Yes," he says, "I object to the fact that clean feeds are impracticable, will degrade internet performance, and not do what they set out to do (which is protect children), but fundamentally the main reason for not adopting them is that it gives power to governments and their instruments to decide sub rosa what we can and cannot see. Suppose that the present government and all the members of the department of telecommunications are exemplary individuals who not only have our best interests at heart, but do so intelligently and effectively. Can we guarantee that the next government, or a much later bureaucracy, will consist of these people? Not at all, which is why checks and balances are a crucial aspect of democratic government."
Go and have a look at the whole post to see the full development of his argument. This is one of the best discussions that I've seen of this subject to date. Better still, I'm pleased to see how much John has been weighing in of late in opposition to the creeping moralism - even a tendency to theocracy-lite - in current Australian politics.
"Yes," he says, "I object to the fact that clean feeds are impracticable, will degrade internet performance, and not do what they set out to do (which is protect children), but fundamentally the main reason for not adopting them is that it gives power to governments and their instruments to decide sub rosa what we can and cannot see. Suppose that the present government and all the members of the department of telecommunications are exemplary individuals who not only have our best interests at heart, but do so intelligently and effectively. Can we guarantee that the next government, or a much later bureaucracy, will consist of these people? Not at all, which is why checks and balances are a crucial aspect of democratic government."
Go and have a look at the whole post to see the full development of his argument. This is one of the best discussions that I've seen of this subject to date. Better still, I'm pleased to see how much John has been weighing in of late in opposition to the creeping moralism - even a tendency to theocracy-lite - in current Australian politics.
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