Deriving "ought" from "is"

I often see it claimed that you can't derive an "ought" from an "is", and I have some sympathy for that view, which is often referred to as "Hume's Law". But I'm reminded by a discussion on Facebook, where I just chipped in, that Hume's point was more subtle.

His complaint seems to be that many philosophers go along piling up "is" statements; then you notice that somewhere along the way they've slipped into "ought" language. But how is that possible? As we'd put it in modern lingo, it seems that no number of statements using the copula "is" can ever (just as a matter of propositional logic) entail a statement with the copula "ought". So it appears that, if these philosophers have arguments that are valid (just as a matter of propositional logic), then they must be relying somewhere on one or more unstated premises that contain "ought". But, I take it Hume is suggesting, such premises are likely to be controversial. Accordingly, we shouldn't be persuaded by the arguments of these other philosophers.

But I think it can be taken a bit further when the famous passage in Hume's Treatise of Human Nature is read in the context of the entire meta-ethical discussion that precedes it. It appears that Hume believes you can derive an "ought" from an "is" in some cases. You can't do it as a matter of propositional logic, but if you understand the meaning of "ought" you can do it as a matter of semantics.

Compare the following:

Premise: Foo is a bachelor.
Conclusion: Foo is male and is not married.

Given the meaning of the word "bachelor", this deduction is perfectly valid. It's a matter of semantics - of meanings - not a matter of using the rules of propositional logic, such as modus ponens, modus tollens, etc.

Hume seems to have a similar idea about how we ground "ought" statements. For Hume, the meaning of "ought" is such that the following (or something like it) is a valid argument:

Premise 1.: Professor Snark has a desire for chocolate.
Premise 2.: Professor Snark believes (or should it be "correctly believes"?) that there is chocolate in the cupboard.
Conclusion: Professor Snark has a reason to go to the cupboard to find the chocolate.
Further conclusion: All other things being equal, Professor Snark ought to go to the cupboard to find the chocolate.

I.e., for Hume to say that somebody "ought" to do something is just to say that they have a reason to do it, or perhaps a reason that actually prevails over any contrary reasons that they might also have.

And we can then look at various kinds of "oughts". Perhaps, for Hume, a moral ought is a reason that is based not just on any old desire but a desire for the welfare or the non-suffering of others, a kind of sympathy for others' pain. Thus, Hume would probably accept something like this as a valid argument.

Premise 1.: Jill Bloggs sympathises with the suffering of Joe Sixpack.
Premise 2.: If Jill Bloggs stops the torturer stretching Joe Sixpack on the rack, Joe Sixpack's suffering will be relieved.
Conclusion: Jill Bloggs has a (moral) reason to stop the torturer stretching Joe Sixpack on the rack.
Further conclusion: Jill Bloggs (morally) ought to stop the torturer stretching Joe Sixpack on the rack.

Obviously, things get a bit more complicated than this. What if Jill doesn't feel any sympathy Joe? We might still want to say that she ought to do what she can to prevent his torture. I think that Hume, at least in his later work, realised that it gets a bit messy, and that the above analysis might be too simple. But he'd still insist that somewhere along the line the various kinds of "oughts" that we recognise will always involve something like a desire and that moral "oughts" will always involve something like sympathy (or desire for another being's non-suffering).

This is all putting the point in modern language, and of course I don't know exactly how Hume would phrase things if he had absorbed modern ways of discussing such issues, but I'm confident that he'd consider the above to be at least a reasonable first approximation of his position. His real point is not to say that "ought" claims are totally ungrounded, but to say that we need to understand the character of "ought" claims and to see how they can't be grounded in just any old "is" ... but must be grounded in certain contingent features of human psychology such as desire and sympathy. He'd insist that morality could never motivate us unless it were grounded in desires (in a broad sense) as well as reason.

Although the theory says that oughts can be grounded, and are not just mysterious, it's importantly a subjectivist theory. Hume doesn't think "ought" claims are altogether ungrounded, but he thinks that they are grounded in the desires and so on that people actually have, so some reference will need to be made to those people and their psychological characteristics. There are no objective "ought" statements in the sense of "ought" statements that are true, totally independently of the psychological characteristics that various human subjects actually have. On the other hand, he thought we were sufficiently similar psychologically to be able to reach agreement on what people (morally) ought to do in various situations. He'd have loved the modern idea that there is an evolved human psychology that underpins our responsiveness to other human beings and our sympathy towards any creature that we can imagine suffering pain.

I happen to think that the views that I've attributed to Hume are more or less correct, but that's not such much my point. My point is more to emphasise that Hume was saying something much richer - more subtle and complex - than just the fact that you can't, as a matter of propositional logic, deduce an "ought" statement from an "is" statement.

But, of course, he realised that too.

On the baggage of transhumanism

Over here for this one!

Look at these anti-abortion morons

Over at the Unreasonable Faith blog, Daniel Florien posts a YouTube video in which anti-abortionists are asked a very simple (and fair) question: If they want abortion to be a crime, what penalty do they propose? One after another, they flounder, unable to give an answer that is even coherent in most cases. One young woman has a few more-or-less coherent remarks that lead her down an uncomfortable path of claiming that maybe it should be life imprisonment, depending on whether the woman understood what she was doing. The rest of them make no sense at all. In all cases, they are embarrassed by the question and unable to discuss it with any confidence.

As Florien comments, they are not able to take their beliefs to their logical conclusion because they know it would be absurd and unfair.

By and large, people who want abortion to be illegal are simply idiots who have a view that is unworthy of your respect (though they have every right to express it of course). The video provides nice evidence of this, just in case you needed it.

How to avoid a spiral of nonsense; or, the transhumanists strike back

Sorry, guys, you have to head over to Sentient Developments to read this one.

Freedom of religion and belief - submission sent

Last weekend, I actually did finalise and send off my submission to the current project on freedom of religion and belief (being conducted under the auspices of the Australian Human Rights Commission). I can't think of many more important issues for our Western societies than what kind of freedom is granted to belief of various kinds. The more I've been looking at this issue, the more I conclude that there have been tendencies to make it include both too much and not enough. The tendency to make it include not enough comes from the pressure for only "nice" beliefs to be given freedom. I say that, absent some compelling justification, we should be free to believe whatever we want, not just whatever nice ideas we want. This dovetails with freedom of expression - we should be free to express our beliefs, not just nice beliefs. For example, it used to be popular in fundamentalist Protestant circles to believe that the Roman Catholic Church is the "Whore of Babylon", described in the Book of Revelation. I'm willing to bet that there are still plenty of fundies who believe that. It's a particularly stupid doctrine, and certainly not a nice touchy-feely one. But they are free to believe it, and should also be free to express it.

At the same time, there's a tendency to make the doctrine include too much. You can believe whatever you want, express it, conduct your rituals, and so on, and there should be no limit to what beliefs, doctrines, organisations, rituals and so on are protected. Except it's not a get-out-of-jail free card if you break secular laws that have general application. If the objects used in your rituals attract sales tax or the GST, you must pay it when you purchase your paraphernalia - just like everyone else. If your rituals involve human sacrifice, you'd better modify them, because religion doesn't exempt you from the ordinary law applying to murder. If you practice as a medical doctor, then you are in a position of power vis-a-vis your patients, which requires that codes of medical ethics be put in place to protect patients from doctors who, for example, want to impose their own morality on their patients' lives. You must follow the code of ethics, even if some aspect of it conflicts with your religion.

I'm not against some reasonable flexibility in the laws to accommodate people who might be seriously disadvantaged for any reason, religious or otherwise. Moreover, part of the problem is that there are so many laws around that cannot be justified at all - they look particularly harsh when they cause problems for people with religious beliefs. But the solution isn't to extend the political principle of freedom of religion; it's that the state should stop enacting and enforcing laws that don't have a clear, legitimate, secular justification in the first place. In the criminal sphere, legislatures should stop enacting prohibitions that can't be justified against the harm principle (and some cautious, principled extensions of it). All of these principles - freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and the harm principle - are consistent with each other, and indeed they dovetail nicely. But that's on the assumption that we give them all full effect while not making any of them do work outside what they actually cover.

Obama's inauguration - and what was that about science and non-believers?

So far, I've only heard a radio extract of Barack Obama's inauguration speech - though a fairly long one played on the ABC. He really is an awesome orator, isn't he, but what's with the cheesy music in the background?

Never mind, the substance is what counts, and much of it was inspiring. I liked the contemptuous references to putting away childish things - quoting scripture back at the outgoing Bush administration - and to following false prophecies promises ("prophecies" would have been better).

So far, I have a good feeling about this new president. Despite all his stupid decisions, Bush was obviously not an idiot (yes, I'm serious: it's all too tempting to characterise these people simply as idiots), and he had a certain rustic charm before things got tough and he had to make some decisions. But then we were treated to the horrible spectacle of eight years of America acting like a bull in a China shop. Worse, this was actually popular with the US public for a long time, before it finally sunk through to Joe Sixpack and his dawg that their country had lost its way in a complex and fragile world.

Well, the new president just shines with intelligence, doesn't he? It's hard to imagine him ever making a totally crazy political choice like the decision to invade Iraq. Not to mention the decision to let things go to hell in Afghanistan, where the original war may or may not have been justified, but at least had something to be said in its favour ... if only there'd been follow-through to build Afghanistan as a successful democratic nation and not let the goddamn Taliban back into the frame.

Well, a blundering regime has gone. Blundering, and sometimes evil - anyone want to recall its resort to terrifying, excruciating, and mind-destroying forms of torture to try to extract information from opponents? Here's to the new regime, and may it meet its daunting challenges. Here's to the impressive Mr Obama and his feisty secretary of state, Hillary Clinton - whatever anyone has against her, she's another very smart person, and it doesn't hurt that she's as tough as they come. Good luck to them in grappling with the problems of America and the world. They'll surely need it, but I can't imagine a team more likely to face up to the task and leave the world better than they found it, when they hand over the reins of power in four, or let's hope eight, years time. If I were a praying man, my prayers would go with them, but they can have my hopes, and a certain confidence that they're at least the right people for the world's biggest and hardest jobs.

Speaking of which, I really could have done without the continual invocations of God at the inauguration ... but I guesss that's how they do things over there on the other side of the pond. It's not going to change in my lifetime, even if Aubrey de Grey helps me extend it a little, so I reckon I just have to grin and bear it.

I'm told - and I now see references here and there on the internet - that Obama said something positive about science and something conciliatory or inclusive about non-believers. That, I think, is about the best that we can hope for from an incoming US president.

If anyone can point me in a direction where I can see more precisely what he did say on those topics, I'll be very grateful.

Freedom of religion at Sentient Developments

I'm currently writing a series of solid posts trying to nail down the idea of freedom of religion. Go over to Sentient Developments and have a look!

Busty virgins upset Chilean clerics

It's been reported that Chilean clerics are upset by a fashion show in which a designer has dressed his models in garb suggesting traditional presentations of the Virgin Mary. I take especial delight in the following announcement from the country's Episcopal Conference, which has just the correctly-weighted mixture of religiose pomposity and post-this/post-that gobbledegook: "We look on with special pain and deplore those acts which seek to tarnish manifestations of sincere love toward the Virgin Mary, which end up striking at the dignity of womankind by presenting her as an object of consumption." Surely that sentence should be eligible for some sort of award. If it doesn't already exist, perhaps it ought to be established. I suggest it be called "The Chilean Episcopal Conference Prize for Moralistic Obscurantism". But maybe somebody out there can do better. The caps I've used don't make a word, or anything, so use your imaginations to improve on it.

Not content, of course, with expressing their "special pain", the local Torquemadas mounted (unsuccessful) legal proceedings in an attempt to stop the show from going ahead. All of which shows that freedom of religion and belief is fine with Church officials as long as it means their freedom to call on the apparatus of the state to you make you conform to their religious beliefs.

My latest plug for Sentient Developments

Don't forget to check out Sentient Developments. I'll be guest posting there starting today - but first to get some sleep. Let's leave it a few hours, shall we?

No one wants parallel importation

At the moment the Productivity Commission has 59 submissions up on its site about the issue of ending restrictions on parallel importation of books. Mine is there somewhere.

I think I counted 3 out to the 59 that supported the idea. Maybe I'm wrong and there's actually 4 (in fact one was sufficiently oblique that I couldn't work out what it was really saying).

It will be fascinating to see how this pans out. There's going to be some free trade bias at the Commission, of course, but then again, I have a strong free trade bias myself, and I even found reasons to worry about and argue against a change in policy. It looks like there is almost no support for a change of policy, as a matter of fact, and plenty of reasons have been set out in the more substantial submissions as to how and why a change could be culturally harmful. I mean cultural harm on a scale that will outweigh any small economic gain.

The submissions going up on the site are running about a week behind. I imagine that quite a lot more will have gone in over the last week, with the deadline on Tuesday. I'll eagerly read the rest of them when they become available. I'm betting that the ratio won't change much and that in the end there will be twelve or fifteen submissions arguing against the change for every one that favours it.

So, will this proposal be dropped like a hot potato or will whoever is behind it press on? The sooner there's certainty the better, because Australian publishers must currently be sitting on manuscripts, worried about what a change of policy might mean for their operations.

By the way, since I've published most of my work of any significance overseas, and have never had a book with an Australian trade publisher, this doesn't really affect me. Indeed, if I were thinking about it from a purely selfish viewpoint, I might even benefit slightly from the proposed change - it would make it easier to get books by me published overseas - of which I hope there will be many in the future - to Australia straightaway.

But I'm not a typical case, and I'm not worried about myself. My concern is that it looks like the current arrangements really have helped new Australian authors over the past decade or two. I think this is the clinching argument: why go from a system that has a good record of nurturing talent to one that is likely (when you analyse it) not to do as well?