tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post1836585851010752684..comments2023-10-26T22:06:11.166+11:00Comments on Metamagician3000: Sean Carroll dobs me in - a little bit about fate and free willRussell Blackfordhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12431324430596809958noreply@blogger.comBlogger68125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-88712047460384093472011-08-02T05:12:02.893+10:002011-08-02T05:12:02.893+10:00March Hare,
I agree that an important meaning of ...March Hare,<br /><br />I agree that an important meaning of probability claims is as an expression of ignorance. In that sense, when I say the probability of tails was 1/2 (after the coin has come up heads) I can be referring to my ignorance before I saw the result. At that time I had no reason to expect one outcome more than the other. Similarly, "it could have happened" can refer to a possibility that was still live (for me) at the time. For example, "as far as we knew at the time, the coin under his hand could have been tails, even though it turned out later to have been heads all along".<br /><br />But in both cases (probability and "could have") I think it's a mistake to restrict the meaning to _just_ this interpretation. Not only do meanings vary from instance to instance, but I argue that any given instance can have multiple meanings. Meaning is ultimately an interpretation that we put on a causal process in the brain, and a given utterance may be caused by multiple processes, corresponding to multiple meanings. (That's my theory of meaning in a nutshell.)Richard Weinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18095903892283146064noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-22197514553510198352011-08-01T18:53:25.836+10:002011-08-01T18:53:25.836+10:00Maybe an example might better address your questio...Maybe an example might better address your question, March Hare. Say you look at a restaurant menu and decide to have tomato soup, and not the French onion soup. You've made a choice, but when you order, you find out that there's no soup today. So neither option was <i>really</i> an option. And yet, you made a choice. <br /><br />The fact that we make choices does not mean that any of the choices we make correspond to physical possibilities, though (fortunately) they often do. Similarly, the alternatives we <i>don't</i> choose are still alternatives, even if they aren't physically possible. To be an alternative is to be represented as an alternative. <br /><br />So, with the soup example, you had options with respect to the menu, even if you didn't have options with respect to the restaurant staff. Of course, even though the staff tells you there's no soup, you could theoretically go into the kitchen yourself make some tomato soup. The fact that the restaurant does not offer you soup as an alternative does not mean you are physically incapable of having your soup at that restaurant.Jason Streitfeldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06950357341620206095noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-33066527662321858102011-08-01T18:40:28.204+10:002011-08-01T18:40:28.204+10:00Richard, I think it all boils down to your positio...Richard, I think it all boils down to your position and knowledge within the system.<br /><br />When I play poker and require a heart as the last card to make my flush then I bet as I feel as if I could win (or afterwards, could have won). That is because I am ignorant of an actual certainty within the system (the card is what the card is). However if we play with transparent cards then I know what the final card will be and alter my strategy accordingly since I know whether I will win or not.<br /><br />If I have set up the deck then I know what order the cards are in and know that it could not have been different but the person next to me is ignorant of this and they think it could have been different had the shuffle been slightly different.<br /><br />If you take another step back and understand the mechanics of the shuffle machine and know the order of the cards placed in it then you will know the order that will be returned - this will be a definite piece of data that could not have been otherwise and yet everyone else, who are ignorant of this, will think each card could have been something different.<br /><br />I think the point is that the phrase "could have done" is simply betraying our ignorance of the system and shows that we deal with it using probabilities which, by their very nature, entail a "could have been different" aspect. Reality may disagree.March Harehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13116034158087704885noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-57006446311380074132011-07-31T21:38:08.410+10:002011-07-31T21:38:08.410+10:00March Hare: It is represented to us as an alterna...March Hare: It is represented to us as an alternative which we evaluate according to (often flexible) standards. The process of deliberation may be completely deterministic, but there's plenty of evidence that such processes occur. They occur frequently in plain sight, in public discourse.<br /><br />A comparison to natural selection might help. Darwin's use of the term "natural selection" might seem metaphorical, as if natural selection were fundamentally unlike artificial selection. I don't think that's the case.<br /><br />Perhaps you think determinism means that there is neither natural nor artificial <i>selection</i>--that the term is inappropriate in a deterministic universe. I don't think that makes much sense. As I wrote in my last post, postulating an uncaused event would not make our decisions any more real. It would only make them utterly arbitrary.<br /><br />Back to Darwin . . . Natural selection occurs when genotypes dominate their competitors in a population. They are differentially selected, which means that they dominate because they satisfy certain conditions better than their competitors. Similarly, in artificial selection, genotypes become dominant because they satisfy certain conditions better than their competitors. The only difference is that, in artificial selection, the process has a new, unnecessary element: plans. The conditions which must be satisfied in artificial selection are part of breeding plans.<br /><br />So, in both artificial and natural selection, the process can be completely deterministic, and yet the term "selection" has a precise and appropriate meaning, and this meaning is not so different from what we normally mean when we talk about decisions and choices. The main differences are that (1) in the latter case, we are selecting plans themselves, and not genotypes, and (2) the outcome of the process of selection is not the prevalence of a genotype in a population, but the adoption of an intention (represented plan of action) in human behavior.<br /><br />Just as genotypes can be selected in a deterministic universe, so too can plans. We call the former sort of selection "speciation" and "breeding," and the latter sort "making a decision."Jason Streitfeldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06950357341620206095noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-73219286020273244982011-07-31T18:24:02.816+10:002011-07-31T18:24:02.816+10:00I've been giving quite a lot of thought to the...I've been giving quite a lot of thought to the meaning of "could have done". It's the sort of difficult semantic question that interests me. My conclusion is that "could have done" has a broad meaning that can subsume a number of more specific, narrower meanings.<br /><br />It may help to see things more clearly if we look at examples that don't involve a person, and so where the fraught issue of "free will" doesn't arise. It seems to me that the same reasoning that leads some people to deny that "he could have done otherwise" in a deterministic world should also lead them to deny that an impersonal event "could have happened otherwise". For example, if a tossed coin has come up heads, it seems to follow (by the same reasoning) that it couldn't have come up tails. If we accept that it could have come up tails, this seems to undermine the basis for saying "he couldn't have done otherwise".<br /><br />Consider two coins that have come up heads, where A is a normal coin and B a two-headed coin:<br /><br />(1) "Coin A could have come up tails".<br />(2) "Coin B couldn't have come up tails".<br /><br />It seems to me that a useful distinction is being made here, and that (1) and (2) are conveying some real information about the different natures of the coins, even in a deterministic universe. To the extent that (1) is conveying real, useful information, it seems fair to say that it's true in some sense.<br /><br />I think there's a parallel with the "interpretations of probability" debate. The probabilistic equivalents (at least in some respects) of (1) and (2) are:<br /><br />(3) "Coin A had probability 1/2 of coming up heads or tails".<br />(4) "Coin B had probability 1 of coming up heads and 0 of tails".<br /><br />The determinist incompatibilist seems to be denying the possibility of making useful probability estimates (other than 1 or 0) for events whose outcome is already known. Yet surely (3) and (4) are conveying real, useful information about the different natures of the coins.<br /><br />Just as philosophers and probability theorists have recognised multiple meanings of probability, I think there are roughly parallel meanings of "could". I think the interpetation given by some (that it refers to alternate prior states) is too specific. I don't think people generally have alternate prior states in mind (even at a subconscious level) when they say "could". Such an interpretation may be a useful technical ("philosophical") sense, but to insist that it's _the_ sense is mistaken, in my opinion.<br /><br />I think each side in this debate is trivially right about whether "he could have done otherwise" given the sense that they each mean it. But those senses don't encompass the full meaning of "could have". And, as you might expect from something which is trivially true (or false) it's not a useful conclusion in either of those senses.Richard Weinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18095903892283146064noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-90206149723753881192011-07-31T12:49:48.516+10:002011-07-31T12:49:48.516+10:00Jason: "This does not imply that the alternat...Jason: <i>"This does not imply that the alternatives were ever physically possible, nor does it imply that the decision could have been other than what it was."</i><br /><br />Then in what sense is it an alternative or a choice?<br /><br />If I do not fly away when a car is heading towards me, since it's physically impossible, is that a decision I have made, was it ever an actual alternative?<br /><br />Or, as I suspect, are we adding a lot of unspoken assumptions to what constitutes a 'valid' alternative and hiding them when we say that no alternatives were physically possible but they were genuine alternatives nonetheless?March Harehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13116034158087704885noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-4819149217123349222011-07-31T11:26:41.622+10:002011-07-31T11:26:41.622+10:00It looks like the confusion has played out, but I&...It looks like the confusion has played out, but I'm compelled to throw in a couple of cents. I'm sympathetic with Russell here, and I'm curious how much agreement there is between us.<br /><br />To say we make a choice or a decision is merely to say that we adopt one plan among given alternatives. This does not imply that the alternatives were ever physically possible, nor does it imply that the decision could have been other than what it was. All it implies is that (1) there are representations of plans as options for future behavior, (2) one of those representations becomes an active part of our behavior (as an intention) and (3) the representation of an option as such plays a causal role in the production of the intention (I suppose by satisfying some conditions which we normally think of as wants/needs). There need not be a "free" act which takes us from (1) to (2). There simply need be (1), (2) and (3). That's enough for there to be a decision/choice.<br /><br />I think that's the sort of thing Russell has in mind. It fits our normal talk of decisions/choices and it doesn't require any indeterminacy in the universe. And I agree with Russell that any stipulation of an uncaused act which would presumably get us from (1) to (2) would not make our decision any more real. There is no benefit (explanatory or otherwise) for postulating such an uncaused event. It would make our decisions "free" in a particular sense of that term, but it would also make them utterly arbitrary. We do have the ability to make more or less arbitrary decisions, but our sense of responsibility and accountability does not depend on it, and is not even enhanced by it.<br /><br />When we say "I could have done otherwise," I suppose what we normally mean is that we did not feel strongly compelled to act one way rather than another. Or, if we did feel so compelled, we regard that compulsion as the result of a prior decision which was not compulsory. So we are admitting to a degree of weakness in the conditions which define our decision-making process. This entails a degree of freedom with respect to a particular variety of causal influence--namely, freedom with respect to our own wants/needs. So maybe free will, in common terms, is just the ability to choose without compulsion--that is, without the feeling that we have to choose one option rather than another.Jason Streitfeldhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06950357341620206095noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-57872707667875876472011-07-24T11:46:37.767+10:002011-07-24T11:46:37.767+10:00The book looks more specific than I was talking ab...The book looks more specific than I was talking about, but I guess you have to cover the more general background to make your arguments. I'll definitely buy it and read it.Russell Blackfordhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12431324430596809958noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-54768134617834913922011-07-23T19:35:35.998+10:002011-07-23T19:35:35.998+10:00Thanks, Neil.Thanks, Neil.Russell Blackfordhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12431324430596809958noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-76210446370296285282011-07-23T16:31:21.692+10:002011-07-23T16:31:21.692+10:00Russell, here's the book you asked for.
http:...Russell, here's the book you asked for.<br /><br />http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199601387.doNeilhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12586131772199247420noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-77320306488301738092011-07-21T12:26:06.879+10:002011-07-21T12:26:06.879+10:00Lyndon:
"But, if we are speaking and decidin...Lyndon:<br /><br />"But, if we are speaking and deciding what to do about a criminal's behavior, the statement "'she could have done otherwise,' helps ignore, like in Richard's example, WHAT the state of the brain was at the time of choice, and WHY the state was that way. It encourages us to stop analyzing the situation..."<br /><br />Yes, nice point, and I like your political cards, hope you'll contact me at twc at naturalism dot orgTom Clarkhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08414754510736349472noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-16909555317119062532011-07-21T10:54:58.424+10:002011-07-21T10:54:58.424+10:00And Neil, you really are being a bit nit-picky her...And Neil, you really are being a bit nit-picky here.<br /><br />I don't think I was misleading anyone when I made that concession to my opponents. The people I've actually been debating are mainly Jerry Coyne (a scientist) and Sam Harris (a scientist and philosopher). But I was also thinking of Derk Pereboom, whose argument I think I understand reasonably well. <br /><br />Your characterisation of Pereboom's approach as a pincer movement is good - I must use that. But any quantum events that have causal impact on our decisions are still part of the causal order - i.e. they feed in to what happens later. I think it's perfectly fair as shorthand to say that Pereboom bases his argument on the idea that we are unable to step out of the causal order when we make decisions.<br /><br />So I don't see what is wrong with conceding that Jerry Coyne, Sam Harris, and Derk Pereboom make these kinds of arguments rather than using arguments based on the sorts of issues raised in, say, the Lazy Argument or by Richard Taylor when he defends what he thinks of as a form of fatalism.<br /><br />All that said, I wish you'd write a book on all this. You did a wonderful job of clearing up a lot of confused issues in an accessible way in your book on moral relativism. I can't think of anyone who could do a better job with this whole area of free will/determinism/fatalism, etc. So how about it? I'd totally buy that book and plug it to others.<br /><br />I'd also be interested in your argument for hard determinism or hard incompatibilism. The debate that I'm involved in here is about whether causal determinism (+ the element of chancy indeterminism that I'm sure Jerry and Sam accept even if they don't always refer to it) are incompatible with free will. I'd love to have you reinforce me on my position that they are not. I could do with the reinforcement because, hey, I seem to be adopting a position that's a minority one in my corner of the internet even if it's a majority one among philosophers.<br /><br />But sure, if you have an independent reason to think that we don't have free will would you care to sketch it for us? Maybe you'll convince me. I'm not at all convinced by the arguments that Jerry and Sam have been putting, but that doesn't mean I'm beyond being convinced. My position is actually not that far from Pereboom's - it's largely a matter of semantics. In fact, even my differences with Sam Harris on this are largely a matter of semantics. But if you have an argument that's independent of the sort of considerations we've been debating, by all means throw it into the mix.Russell Blackfordhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12431324430596809958noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-15894629733281101852011-07-21T03:14:06.786+10:002011-07-21T03:14:06.786+10:00Over at Jerry's place I left a comment along t...Over at Jerry's place I left a comment along these lines:<br /><br />Another thing that “people mean by free will” is that people feel the burden of making choices. To put it in sharp terms, we may imagine a smoker who has just quit, and is now “deciding” whether to have a cigarette or not. The fact that free will is an illusion does not change this person’s predicament in any way, right?Phil Jensennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-83266386981993883802011-07-21T02:04:32.479+10:002011-07-21T02:04:32.479+10:00This discussion needs an explicit dose of the New ...This discussion needs an explicit dose of the New (a.k.a. "Causal") Theory of Reference, and Natural Kind Terms.<br /><br />Some people seem to think that words have strict definitions, and that if the definition is false, the word fails to refer to anything real.<br /><br />By that standard, water doesn't exist because it turns out not to be an element, and gold doesn't exist because it turns out not to be a compound.<br /><br />In general, the "definitions" of words are provisional, and are used to establish reference to real things in the world. Actual strict definitions are only possible once you've understood the thing being referred to.<br /><br />People successfully referred to "water" and "gold" and "life" and "species" for a very long time without knowing the actual definitions of any of those terms in the classical sense.<br /><br />Same for "choice" and "deciding"---we've been talking about something real, which we've observed and named, and if it turns out to be surprisingly deterministic, that's fine. It is what it turns out to be, just as water is suprisingly compound, gold is surprisingly elemental, life is surprisingly mechanistic, and species are surprisingly mutable.<br /><br />Supposed "definitions" matter a whole lot less than prototypical examples of the obviously real things we're talking about.<br /><br />It's funny how many scientists, of all people, miss this utterly basic point, and jump on philosophers who think and talk <i>like scientists</i> about <i>observed things</i>.Paul W.https://www.blogger.com/profile/13909647399634037101noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-54361414456678751922011-07-21T01:37:30.255+10:002011-07-21T01:37:30.255+10:00To put my political cards on the table, the "...To put my political cards on the table, the "could of done otherwise" of an individual's choice is to obscure the analysis of why that individual made the choice that they did. As far as choosing from a menu goes, it is of little concern, usually, to why we chose the cake instead of the pie, though we may have fun guessing the genealogical roots of our love for cake or evolutionary pressures for cake-loving. And, maybe we should even revel in our own little idiosyncracies.<br /><br />But, if we are speaking and deciding what to do about a criminal's behavior, the statement "she could have done otherwise," helps ignore, like in Richard's example, WHAT the state of the brain was at the time of choice, and WHY the state was that way. It encourages us to stop analyzing the situation. As someone concerned with behavioralism, social constructionism, discourse theory, evolutionary psychology, etc., I believe that we can start analyzing or at least accepting the multitude of factors that are structuring this individual. To simply say, that this was an expression of this individual's character is to gloss over why it is an expression of this individual's character; for instance, bad neighborhood, broken home, Freudian unconscious structures (if we must), genetic structures, the glorifying of criminal activity, poverty, the totality of this individual's life story, etc. <br /><br />To say that the individual "could have done otherwise" is to help focus the attention onto the individual instead of the society that is equally responsible for determining this individual and his brain state at the time of the choice, which I take follows from the idea that an "individual is nothing more than the product of the genes and the environment." The "environmental" side is too much in the control of society, of our hands, to not ask how such an environment has failed that individual. The "could of done otherwise" helps create the notion of this autonomous entity that is acting against the world instead of asking deep, complicated (and for now unanswerable) questions about why this individual's mind is the way it is.<br /><br />Which goes back that we need to set the concept of free will aside, along with many of our other notions about Man, and get on with psychology and analysis of human flourishing in general.Lyndon Pagehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02628514330681989555noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-56340472358883374662011-07-20T23:49:47.752+10:002011-07-20T23:49:47.752+10:00Richard,
The difference between 6 and 7 is what w...Richard,<br /><br />The difference between 6 and 7 is what worries me, mostly from a semantic point, but then certainly as human beings engulf 7 in isolation. If 7 just means that the individual "could have differently" if his "past environment or genes prior to the decision had been different," then 7 is fine. But, since 7 glosses over the more meaty part of 6, the idea that the individual would have done differently if his mind had been different, then 7, to many people, helps reinforce a certain conception of human beings when they state it.<br /><br />When Russell says "he could have chosen otherwise" on his choice on the menu, he is "glossing" the fact that he could have done so either in the weak sense, that many options were open that (seemingly) could have been taken, or "if his brain state had been different." Russell might never imply that his ability to "do otherwise" could mean something different, but to so many people (for instance the majority of the world who still believe in God or other weird stuff), they may wholly accept that his "could have done otherwise" means more than "could have done otherwise - "if his brain state had been different", and instead, mean "could have done otherwise"- in that exact situation with his exact brain state.<br /><br />"Could have done otherwise" and "choice" are phrases that imbue ambiguity on the situation, and if we are anywhere around the area of free will, we should use them carefully and problably not slander the other side with using them innapropriately, since large numbers of people have used them and continue to use them in both ways. Any claims to how the words should be used is usually a normative move to help claim one's own view point to be correct, when of course the definitions and connotations of the phrases are various and problematic, such as people's conceptions of "free will" are various and problematic.Lyndon Pagehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02628514330681989555noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-64210889366667599282011-07-20T21:11:04.044+10:002011-07-20T21:11:04.044+10:00Neil, tell Jerry not me. I weas referring to scien...Neil, tell Jerry not me. I weas referring to scientists such as Jerry and whatever philosophers he is relying on - and whichever of the people who are supporting him or arguing for hard determinism on this thread have credentials as philosophers.<br /><br />The point is, these people who are trained in science or philosophy and are arguing her on Jerry's thread for a hard incompatibilist/hard determinist position are, as far as I've seen in the discussions, which I've read a helluva lot of by now, relying on arguments based on determinism. See for yourself in Jerry's most recent post where that's exactly what he does.Russell Blackfordhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12431324430596809958noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-85534878922554121002011-07-20T20:05:43.422+10:002011-07-20T20:05:43.422+10:00- "It's ice!"
- "Frozen water!...- "It's ice!"<br /><br />- "Frozen water!"<br /><br />- "Ice!" DX<br /><br />- "Frozen water!" DX<<br /><br /><br />Sorry for being flippant. :PSvlad Cjellinoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-25018393808566626682011-07-20T17:50:48.878+10:002011-07-20T17:50:48.878+10:00"I do get that when contemporary philosophers..."I do get that when contemporary philosophers and scientists talk about people not having free will they usually have in mind the claim that we never step out of the causal order of nature, rather than the claim that fatalism is true."<br /><br />I'm going to be picky (again). This just isn't true: philosophers do not oppose free will and the causal order. No one argues that we have free will because (or even 'and') we can step out of the causal order. There are some philosophers, going back to Anscombe, who advance noncausal accounts of human action, but does not entail stepping out of the causal order. People who believe in libertarian free will - that we have genuine alternative possibilities - believe that we have this power in virtue of the causal order. Event-causal libertarians think that quantum level indeterminacy can pull this off. Agent-causal libertarians think that there is a kind of causation one relatum of which is an agent. Shoot, some compatibilists believe something like this: Lewis argued that we have a power such that, were we to exercise that power in certain ways, the past would have been different than it was. None of these people oppose being in the causal order with being unfree. No free will sceptic argues that because we are in the causal order we are unfree. Pereboom and Strawson argue that a pincer movement from causal *determinism* and chancy determinism entail absence of free will. I argue that neither causal determinism nor chancy indeterminism are incompatible with free will - but we lack it anyway for independent reasons.Neilhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12586131772199247420noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-23998172973923077362011-07-20T17:14:06.261+10:002011-07-20T17:14:06.261+10:00Time for some experimental philosophy. ;-) I'd...Time for some experimental philosophy. ;-) I'd like to explore the objections to "could have" statements, by giving a list of counterfactual statements, and asking objectors to please identify which ones they think cannot be true in a deterministic universe.<br /><br />(1) If the house had been hit by lightning, it would have burnt down.<br />(2) If the house had been hit by lightning, it might have burnt down.<br />(3) If the house had been hit by lightning, it could have burnt down.<br />(4) If the state of the atmosphere had been different, what happened to the house could have been different.<br />(5) If the state of Richard's mind had been different, his actions could have been different.<br />(6) If the state of Richard's mind had been different, he could have acted differently.<br />(7) Richard could have acted differently.Richard Weinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18095903892283146064noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-45518995929822289822011-07-20T13:54:43.723+10:002011-07-20T13:54:43.723+10:00Peter, I was with you until the end "unfair t...Peter, I was with you until the end "unfair to hold him responsible." Is there some specific point you wish to make about responsibilities driving your caricature? Because, as far as I can tell, I haven't even taken the next step yet as to consequences, I'm still on base one trying to figure out the definitions compatibilists make vs. the more folksy use of those words.<br /><br />Like I've said elsewhere, I think the world has grown too accustomed to duality, so that when (non-dualistic) philosophers come along and talk determinism there's bound to be misunderstandings.Alexhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10613480150660825848noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-6291741482903901502011-07-20T13:50:25.098+10:002011-07-20T13:50:25.098+10:00Thanks, Russel, things are clearing up, at least t...Thanks, Russel, things are clearing up, at least the definitions used. No, of course "decision" do happen, there is *a* decision being made that the future depends on, and even if I was a hard determinist I'd still posit that the process of mind make some decision. I just have a problem with it when linked to the discussion on free-will where it is assumed, I admit, in a folksy way, that the decision isn't predetermined. I guess it's just a word we use for a fork in the road, even if the outcome couldn't be any other way. I personally feel this is defining "choice" in a way that clashes with the generic way the word is used, ie. that we exercise some degree of control over the decision. I know that shifts the debate to "control" though, and lands us splat down in duality territory again. Bummer.<br /><br />I'll have to think about this some more.Alexhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10613480150660825848noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-18907879593492940802011-07-20T13:06:58.540+10:002011-07-20T13:06:58.540+10:00Probably not, Alexander. But I'm not using the...Probably not, Alexander. But I'm not using the word in any metaphysically-laden way. I'm just using it in the ordinary, everyday sense. E.g., I go to a restaurant and look at the menu. I choose one of the options on offer - the steak, or the chicken, or the veal, or the vegetarian quiche, or the stir fry ...<br /><br />Surely no one is going to tell me that this doesn't happen?<br /><br />If I choose the steak and someone later remonstrates with me for not choosing the vegetarian quiche, "I couldn't have done otherwise" is not a good answer. Yes I could have. But I didn't want to. That's the way we use these ordinary English words.<br /><br />I can see why people might not want to use the term "free will" if they think it's a metaphysically-laden term (even though I'm not at all sure that it is), but are we going to get to the point of having an error theory about ordinary English words such as "choice", "decision", "options", etc., in their ordinary English contexts and usages?Russell Blackfordhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12431324430596809958noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-35754108288558729602011-07-20T10:12:57.020+10:002011-07-20T10:12:57.020+10:00Russel, I'm not sure that last comment was ver...Russel, I'm not sure that last comment was very clarifying for me. Can you explain in no uncertain terms what you mean by "choice"?Alexhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10613480150660825848noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-24761391.post-38833050289840019672011-07-20T04:49:56.346+10:002011-07-20T04:49:56.346+10:00Russell,
I appreciate your post - it's added ...Russell,<br /><br />I appreciate your post - it's added some clarity to this topic for me.<br /><br /><i>We let people of the hook - we're less inclined to make adverse judgments about them - if we can be convinced that they're not really like that. They didn't act in a way that reflected their stable desire sets (because of guns at their heads or whatever). In those circumstances we say their will is overborne.</i><br /><br />As Jerry Coyne often brings up, and I agree with him, we also let people off the hook when we (say) realize that their violent tendencies were probably the result of some horrible, violent upbringing. Right? In courts of law, such circumstances attenuate punishment.<br /><br />Nonetheless, "violent criminal" describes who these people *really* are. It does reflect their stable desire sets.<br /><br />And yet I still feel inclined to be more compassionate toward them. There but for the grace of God go I, and all that. Do you not feel the same? Do you judge these people just as much as anyone else because they are "really like that"?<br /><br />Tim MartinAnonymousnoreply@blogger.com